TY -的A2 Wang Tingsong AU -李,鑫盟道,张非盟-冯,娜娜PY - 2021 DA - 2021/06/02 TI -双通道销售系统在资金约束供应链SP - 8872728六世- 2021 AB -为了实现可持续发展的通信行业,许多银行已经开发出一些新项目为手机品牌公司提供贷款(MPBCs)。本文研究一种完美的信息博弈三方包括:电信运营商(),MPBC和银行。在第一阶段,银行决定利率,显示MPBC和竞争力。在第二阶段,和MPBC从事古诺游戏:同时,后进位TO-as-leader顺序,后进位和MPBC-as-leader顺序现在。和MPBC的决策和生产/销售数量。利率和替代品的影响因素和MPBC的最优决策进行了分析。当替代因素高,低利率,同时现在的总销售额是高于其他两个后进位;在一个较高的利率,总销售额的MPBC-as-leader现在是高于其他两个现在进行。然而,当替代因素是低,在足够低的利率,同时现在的总销售额是高于其他两个后进位;在一个足够高的利率,总销售额的MPBC-as-leader现在是高于其他两个后进位; at a moderate interest rate, the total sales in the TO-as-leader subgame is higher than those in the other two subgames. Besides, the optimal interest rate of the bank is investigated and the impact of the substitute factor on the optimal interest rate is analyzed. The bank sets a higher interest rate in the MPBC-as-leader subgame than those in the other two subgames. Besides, when the substitute factor is low, the bank sets a lower interest rate in the TO-as-leader subgame than that in the simultaneous subgame; however, when the substitute factor is high, the bank sets a higher interest rate in the TO-as-leader subgame than that in the simultaneous subgame. SN - 1058-9244 UR - https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/8872728 DO - 10.1155/2021/8872728 JF - Scientific Programming PB - Hindawi KW - ER -