TY -的A2 - Chen Yuh-Shyan盟——Handouf萨拉非盟-萨比尔,Essaid PY - 2019 DA - 2019/01/06 TI -战略可用性和成本效益的无人机飞行接入网络:S-Modular博弈分析SP - 4897171六世- 2019 AB -如今,无处不在的网络接入已成为现实,由于无人机(uav),获得了极度受欢迎由于其灵活的部署和更高的视线联系地面用户的机会。电信服务提供商部署无人机在偏远农村地区,提供区域网络访问受灾地区,或massive-attended事件(体育场馆、节日等),全部设置提供临时的无线覆盖率将会非常昂贵。当然,无人机是电池驱动的能源预算有限流动性方面和沟通方面。一个有效的解决方案是允许无人机交换他们的无线电模块睡眠模式,以延长电池的使用寿命。这导致临时不可用的交流功能。在这种情况下,无人机操作员的最终协议是提供一个具有成本效益的服务与接受的可用性。这将允许会议一些目标的服务质量,而拥有一个良好的市场份额给予满意的效益。在本文中,我们展示一个新的框架和许多有趣的见解如何共同定义的可用性和访问成本UAV-empowered伺机接入网络飞往覆盖目标地理区域。然而,我们构造一个双头垄断模型来捕获服务提供者的敌对行为的定价政策和各自的可用性概率。最优周期报警(UAV)广告的存在是解决,考虑到无人机充电电池容量有限,他们的约束。 A full analysis of the game, both in terms of equilibrium pricing and equilibrium availability, is derived. We show that the availability-pricing game exhibits some nice features as it is submodular with respect to the availability policy; whereas, it is supermodular with respect to the service fee. Furthermore, we implement a learning scheme using best response dynamics that allows operators to learn their joint pricing-availability strategies in a fast, accurate, and distributed fashion. Extensive simulations show convergence of the proposed scheme to the joint pricing-availability equilibrium and offer promising insights into how the game parameters should be chosen to efficiently control the duopoly game. SN - 1574-017X UR - https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/4897171 DO - 10.1155/2019/4897171 JF - Mobile Information Systems PB - Hindawi KW - ER -